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Rolf Jensen & Assoc., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (Aug. 9, 2012)1
CONTRACTS – PREEMPTION OF INDEMNIFICATION
Summary
On petition for writ of mandamus challenging a denial of summary judgment, the Court
considered whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) preempts state law claims for
indemnification brought by an admitted violator of the ADA.
Disposition/Outcome
The ADA preempts indemnification claims brought by owners for their violations thereof
because such claims would pose an obstacle to the ADA.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2002, Mandalay Corporation entered into a contract with petitioner Rolf Jensen &
Associates for consulting services regarding construction of an expansion to the Mandalay Bay
Resort and Casino (the Resort) in compliance with the ADA. The parties’ contract contained a
provision that Rolf Jensen would indemnify Mandalay for any damages arising from an act,
omission, or willful misconduct by Rolf Jensen in performance of its obligations.
After the Resort expansion was constructed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an
investigation of numerous violations of the ADA arising from a lack of handicap accessibility at
the Resort. Thereafter, Mandalay entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with the
DOJ that required Mandalay to bring the Resort into compliance with the ADA. The retrofits
were estimated to cost Mandalay more than $20 million.
Mandalay sued Rolf Jensen in district court seeking to recover the costs of the retrofit.
Following preliminary motion practice, claims remained for (1) express indemnification, (2)
breach of contract, (3) breach of express warranty, and (4) negligent misrepresentation. Rolf
Jensen filed for summary judgment asserting that each claim was preempted by the ADA. The
district court denied Rolf Jensen’s motion for summary judgment. Rolf Jensen petitioned the
Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to grant its motion.
Discussion
Justice Saitta wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court.2 In entertaining the petition, the
Court noted that the issue of preemption under the ADA was an issue of nationwide magnitude
in need of clarification in the courts of Nevada.
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By Amanda Ireland
Justice Pickering voluntarily recused herself from participation in this decision.

A. Preemption
The Court reviewed the question of preemption de novo, noting that under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution state law must yield when it frustrates or conflicts with
federal law.3 This petition involved conflict preemption, concerning whether, in view of the
ADA’s purpose and intended effects, Mandalay’s state law claims posed an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress’s objectives in enacting the ADA.
As a threshold matter, the Court noted the “two cornerstones” of preemption: first, that
“the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”4 Second, a
presumption against preemption arose out of respect for state sovereignty when Congress
legislates in fields traditionally occupied by the states. This petition concerned Congress’s
legislation in the area of disability discrimination, a legislative landscape not traditionally
occupied by the states, so the Court found the presumption against preemption did not apply with
particular force in this matter.
B. The ADA
Reviewing the purposed and intended effects of the ADA, the Court found the goal of the
ADA to be twofold: to not only remedy discrimination against disabled individuals but to
prevent it. The ADA had a comprehensive scope covering discriminatory practices disabled
people faced including access to public accommodations.5 Congress also designed the ADA to
prevent discrimination stemming from neglect and indifference as well as intentional
discrimination. So when, as in this case, a facility was not constructed to be readily accessible to
individuals with disabilities, the owner was liable for unlawful discrimination regardless of
intent.6 The Court noted that there were no provisions permitting indemnification or allocations
of liability between various entities subject to the ADA, except for in landlord-tenant
relationships.7
C. Mandalay’s Indemnification Claim
Rolf Jensen argued that indemnification claims such as Mandalay’s were preempted
because they diminished owners’ incentive to comply with the ADA thereby frustrating
Congress’s goal of preventing disability discrimination. Mandalay argued that its
indemnification claim actually advanced the purpose of the ADA because with indemnification,
owners would be more likely to use consultants such as Rolf Jensen which would promote ADA
compliance. Mandalay also argued it was unfair to bear the cost of the retrofit when Rolf Jensen
was a direct factor causing the expenses and that indemnification did not deprive disabled
persons the right to seek relief for violations of the ADA.

Nanopierce Tech. V. Depository Trust, 123 Nev. 362, 370, 168 P.3d 73, 79 (2007).
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 521 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
5 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a); 12183(a)(1) (2006).
7 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(b) (2010).
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The Court agreed with other courts that “flatly rejected” the type of indemnification
claim brought by Mandalay. In the leading case, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that permitting an
owner to, in essence, circumvent responsibility for its violations of the ADA and Fair Housing
Act through an indemnification claim would lessen the owner’s incentive to ensure compliance,
so such claims were preempted.8 Likewise, federal district courts had uniformly concluded that
owners’ indemnification claims for their own ADA violations undermine the goals of the ADA.
The Court concluded that such claims would allow owners to contractually maneuver themselves
into a position where, in essence, they could ignore their nondelegable responsibilities under the
ADA. Thus, the Court held that the ADA preempts indemnification claims brought by owners
for their violations because such claims would pose an obstacle to the ADA.
The Court disagreed with Mandalay’s assertion that permitting indemnification claims
would promote ADA compliance. Owners sought advice to aid in their duty to comply with the
ADA: an indemnification mindset would have a debilitating effect on ADA compliance, as
illustrated by the numerous ADA violations in this case. The surest way to ensure compliance
would be to hold owners’ risks of noncompliance firmly in place.
The Court also disagreed with Mandalay’s contention that preemption was unfair, noting
that a highly sophisticated entity with ultimate authority over all construction decisions, such as
Mandalay, was in the best position to prevent violations. Rolf Jensen was not immunized from
liability for any role in the Mandalay violations, because its liability would run to disabled
individuals rather than to Mandalay. Further, the Court found that although indemnification did
not directly interfere with the rights of disabled individuals to obtain relief under the ADA, the
goal of the ADA was preventative as well as remedial, and Mandalay’s indemnification claim
would thwart the prophylactic aspects of the ADA.
Finally, the Court found unavailing the authorities that Mandalay “patched together” to
seek allocation of responsibility for complying with the ADA, such as the landlord tenant
exception, and the suggestion that the ADA created tort liability, which traditionally allowed
indemnification.
Mandalay’s remaining claims for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and
negligent misrepresentation were also preempted by the ADA, because these claims were in
substance merely a reiteration of Mandalay’s claim for indemnification.
Conclusion
The Court granted Rolf Jensen’s petition for extraordinary relief and issued a writ of
mandamus to direct the district court to grant Rolf Jensen’s motion for summary judgment. The
Court concluded that Mandalay’s state law claims for indemnification posed an obstacle to the
objectives of the ADA and therefore were preempted.
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Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assoc.’s, 602 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 2010).

